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HABEAS CORPUS BORES A HOLE IN PRISONERS'
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS- AN ANALYSIS
OF PREISER v. RODRIGUEZ
JOHN FLANNERY*

Jurisdictional questions, while not always interesting unto themselves, can have serious substantive effects. Until recently, both the
writ of habeas corpus and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provided a
means for prisoners to challenge unconstitutional prison conditions.
Both remedies had evolved from different origins with different purposes but both remedies had arrived at a point of concurrent jurisdiction on condition questions. Although their development suggested
no sound basis for putting the constitutional rights protected by one
remedy on a higher plane there were definite advantages in resorting
to the Civil Rights Act because it was, in terms of scope and speed,
a more effective remedy. The Supreme Court in its recent decision,
Preiserv. Rodriguez,1 has severely limited a prisoner who challenges
certain conditions to one remedy, habeas corpus. The development of
these two remedies belies the Court's conclusion, and it is the purpose
of this article to discuss the development and implications of this
recent ruling.
I.

OuTImN OF THE ISSUE

The writ of habeas corpus, 2 referred to by Chief Justice Marshall
in 1807 as "The Great Writ," 3 is generally understood, but especially
so by prisoners, as a means to attack the legitimacy of one's confinement by attacking the validity of one's sentence or conviction. The
relief available is release. There is one significant limitation when
employing this device. This limitation is born of comity between the
federal and state governments, and is called "exhaustion." 4 If the
prisoner applying for this "Great Writ" is a state prisoner, he must
first resort to the state courts for relief before the federal court will
* Member of the New York Bar. B.S., Fordham University, 1969; BS., Columbia
School of Engineering, 1969; J.D., Columbia, 1972.
1 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1978).
2 Habeas corpus, originally a writ at common law, is now provided for by statute, enabling state prisoners to obtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1970), and federal prisoners to obtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), by means of a motion
to vacate judgment.
3 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
4 This requirement was set forth early. Ex parte Royall, 117 US. 241 (1886). Subse-

quently, exhaustion as a prerequisite for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was codified.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1970). See text accompanying notes 24-32 infra.
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consider his application; the prisoner must "exhaust" available state
judicial remedies. The state is therefore first given an opportunity to
an exhausting requirement.
A prisoner's concern for release compares only with one other
concern - how he is treated while in prison. It is true that the scope
of habeas corpus has expanded so that the writ may be used to scrutinize the conditions of confinement; the Civil Rights Act of 18711 is
however more appropriate to the task. This Act, originally a remedy
to post bellum discrimination, has been accepted, albeit reluctantly, as
a vehicle to examine questionable prison practices.6 It provides relief
for one who has been deprived "under color" of state law of "any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the
United States."7 It has dealt with a plethora of prison problems, although these are not its sole concern." The Civil Rights Act recommends itself for, among other reasons, its speed; the statute does not
require the exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies. 9
Nor does its nature permit abstention. 10 There have been cases in
which the prisoners' civil rights petitions were mere shams, when
prisoners have challenged the validity of their sentence with the ultimate object of obtaining release without fulfilling the exhaustion
requirements." This sham petition is quite different from the one we
will be discussing.
In our problem, the prisoner does not challenge the validity of
his sentence. He petitions when his individual civil rights have been
violated but the appropriate relief includes relief normally associated
with the "Great Writ." Confusing the type of relief requested with
the circumstances of the injury has caused the problem that is Preiser.
This confusion results in no small part due to the overlap of the two
GAct of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 18, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
6 See text accompanying notes 54, 55, 57 infra.
7 The full text of the statute reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
8 See note 57 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 62-82 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 83-93 infra.
1 See Smartt v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1969); Kalec v. Adamowski, 406 F.2d 536
(7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Peinado v. Adult Authority, 405 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 895 U.S. 968 (1969); Johnson v. Walker, 317 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963); King v. McGinnis, 289 F. Supp. 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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remedies. 12 A concrete example of this situation would be the case of
a prisoner who both had good time withdrawn and was placed in
segregation without a prior hearing. He has been denied due process.
The remedy in such a case requires a release from solitary and the
restoration of good time lost. However the restoration of good time
may lead to release. It will certainly shorten the term of confinement.
Release is a habeas remedy, and habeas corpus requires exhaustion.
When the Second Circuit considered this question en banc, it
decided that such a situation was properly challenged in a civil rights
action, and in view of an almost contemporaneous Supreme Court
decision, Wilwording v. Swenson,' 3 exhaustion was not required.14 Subsequently the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit.'; Speaking through Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court
in Preisersaid that if the appropriate remedy is release, or even the reduction of the term of confinement by the restoration of good time,
then the appropriate vehicle is a writ of habeas corpus, not a civil
rights complaint, and exhaustion is required.
II. NATURE OF THE REMEDIES
Both the writ of habeas corpus and the Civil Rights Act of 1871
have been the subject of some discussion. 0 This is not surprising since
both remedies have grown beyond their original functions,17 and since
both have been used by state prisoners with increasing frequency.' 8
See notes 41-54 infra and accompanying text.
13 404 U.S. 249 (1971). In Wilwording, state prisoners challenged prison conditions by
way of federal habeas corpus after state habeas petitions had been dismissed. While the
district court dismissed the petitions as other state remedies, e.g., injunctive relief, still
existed, the Supreme Court held the petitioners' claims were cognizable under the Civil
Rights Act, and hence exhaustion was not required. Id. at 251.
14 Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972).
15 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
16 The best general works on habeas corpus remain Developments in the Law Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038 (1970); R. SOEOL, FEDERAL IABAs CoRPus
(2d ed. 1969); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); see also Brennen, Federal Habeas Corpus and State
Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961); Meador, The Impact of
FederalHabeas Corpus in State Trial Procedures,52 U. VA. L. REv. 286 (1966).
The Civil Rights Act has drawn some attention as well. See generally Note, Prisoner's
Rights Under § 1983, 6 CRIm. L. BULL. 237 (1970); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action
in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1486 (1969); Comment, Exhaustion of
State Remedies under the Civil Rights Act, 68 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1201 (1968); Comment,
Section 1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 1352 (1970); Comment, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts,
72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
17 See text accompanying notes 21-93 infra.
IS See Zeigler, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 159, 171 n.48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Zeigler].
12
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Prisoners, usually acting, not without some frustration,19 as their own
counsel, 20 have attempted to decipher the meaning of these two remedies as they apply to them.
It is apparent, from the complicated history of the two remedies
and the nature of the dispute in Preiser,that the only way either to
prepare an intelligent exegesis of Preiser or to predict Preiser's possible progeny is to consider the history of these two remedies.
A.

The Writ of Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus was inscribed in English Law in the
17th Century21 and preserved in our American Constitution in the
18th Century. 22 Federal courts were first authorized to release state
prisoners in the 19th Century. 23 This last authorization was construed
by the states as a threat to the balance of power between the state and
federal governments.
1. Exhaustion. The potential for conflict between state and federal government was somewhat assuaged when, in 1886, the Supreme
Court said in Ex Parte RoyaUl24 that although the federal courts had
the power, by means of the writ, to "wrest" a petitioner from the custody of state officers, even in advance of his trial in the state court,
the federal court is "not bound in every case to exercise such power." 25
The Supreme Court exhorted federal courts to await the exhaustion
of available state judicial remedies rather than disturb relations "...
by unnecessary conflict between courts [state and federal] equally
bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution. ' 26
19 Frustration is apparently not restricted to the illiterate prisoner. One "writ writer,"
Charles Larsen asked:
Why did I cease to litigate my case? Justice itself an elusive abstraction, is a fiction. It assumes an air of reality only because the majority of people in this country live their lives without being required to seek justice. The unfortunate ones
who seek justice find that it exists only in the mind of judges.
Larsen, A PrisonerLooks at Writ-Writing,56 CALw. L. Rsv. 343 (1968).
20 The practice of jailhouse law was sanctioned in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969), when a state regulation prohibiting inmates from assisting one another in the
drafting of legal papers was invalidated.
2131 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679).
22 "Preserved" in the sense that it could not be suspended. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 2 reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it."
23 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
24 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
25 Id. at 251.
26 Id.
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27
Subsequently, in 1948, this exhaustion requirement was codified
28
drawing its raison d'etre from federal-state comity.
The exhaustion requirement has evolved reasonably in many
30
29
respects. One need not resort to an ineffective or inappropriate
state remedy before applying to the federal court. Nor is a petitioner
necessarily barred from seeking habeas corpus relief on the grounds of
failure to exhaust state remedies when the petitioner has been barred
from further state relief as, for example, where he has failed to make
a timely appeal of his conviction. The Supreme Court has said that

exhaustion only applies to ".

.

. state remedies still open to the appli-

cant at the time he files his application of habeas corpus in the federal
court."'31 This rule is subject to the important proviso that the federal

court has discretion to deny habeas relief to anyone who has "delib2
erately bypassed" state judicial procedures.3
2. Bargain with the Devil. One might expect that once a matter
has been contested in the state court it would be res judicata and
therefore barred from consideration in a subsequent habeas corpus
action. Prior to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 33 that was the case;
there was no re-consideration of state fact finding in a collateral federal
proceeding.8 4 However in Brown v. Allen, 35 it was suggested that in
certain cases a de novo fact hearing was appropriate. 36 It was left to
27 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967. This exhaustion provision is today codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1970). Section 2254 applies to state prisoners only. A federal
prisoner can not rely on section 2241 to challenge his conviction unless section 2255 is inadequate or unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). It is interesting to note that even section
2255 has an exhaustion requirement, in that the petitioner must complete his direct
appeal, except in extraordinary circumstances, before the court will entertain a section
2255 motion. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1939).
28 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963); Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
29 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
30 See Williams v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967) (state prematurity rule precludes collateral relief); United States ex reL. Michelotti v. Price, 230 F. Supp. 505 (W.D.
Pa. 1964) (no state relief available to parolee).
81 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963).
32 Id. at 438. In Fay v. Noia, Noia's co-defendants appealed their convictions but
were unsuccessful. Subsequently Noia's co-defendants overturned their convictions because
their confessions had been coerced. Noia had decided not to appeal after his conviction
because he feared that if he appealed he would be subjected to a more severe sentence on
remand. The Court held that in view of Noia's "grisly choice," his failure to appeal was
not a "deliberate by-pass." Id. at 439-40. The "deliberate by-pass" rule also finds application in the case of a motion to vacate made by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1970). See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8 (1969).
83 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
84 Facts asserted in response to petitioner's writ had to be accepted despite the petitioner's attempt to controvert them. No federal hearings were held. See Frank v. Mangum,
237 U.S. 309, 329-30 (1915).
35 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
36 The Court held that a de novo fact hearing was appropriate when there were "un-
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Townsend v. Sain 37 to describe more explicitly what these categories
were.38 This liberalization of the writ has not been quietly accepted;
Congress resisted the Townsend categories in 196639 and in Congress today there is an attempt to derogate, if not to abrogate, the scope of the
writ.40 These opponents of the expanding writ might agree with Justice
Rehnquist, who in a different context, characterized this "liberalizing"
as the product of a "bargain with the devil." 41
3. Conditions as well as Confinement. Notwithstanding this resistance to the "new and improved" writ, the writ has expanded in
still another way. It may now be used to challenge not only the validity
of confinement but also the conditions of confinement.
It has been said in dicta that habeas is only available for the re4 and several circuits
lease of prisonersO2
have said that habeas corpus
is not available to challenge prison conditions. 43 Nevertheless the writ
usual circumstances," 344 US. at 468, or the fact finding process in the state court was
vitally flawed, 44 US. at 506, or where in the judge's discretion an evidentiary hearing
seemed merited, 844 US. at 463-64.
37 872

US. 293 (1963).

38 Townsend provided six categories which required a federal evidentiary hearing:
(1)inadequate state fact-finding procedures; (2) the prisoner alleges newly discovered

evidence; (3)inadequate development of facts in state court; (4) the state finding is not
"fairly supported"; (5) the state courts failed to resolve the relevant factual questions; and
(6) any other situations which would not provide a full and fair fact hearing. Id. at 31218.
39 See H.R. Rie. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The categories described by
the Court in Townsend were codified at 28 US.C. § 2254(d) (1970). See Note, Developments in the Law -Federal Habeas Corpus, 88 HAuv. L. REv. 1038, 1122 n.46 (1970).
This codification responded to Congressional pressure at least to the extent that the statute
accords a presumption of correctness to state determinations.
40 The Senate bill threatening to do this would take the presumption of correctness
previously mentioned, supra note 89, one step further. S.567, 98d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
This bill would, among other things, make any state determination conclusive subject only
to Supreme Court review and it would further require that the alleged violation be related to the reliability of the state fact-finding process such that absent the violation a
different result would probably have been reached. Id. § 2(a). For a further discussion of
this bill, see Note, Proposed Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus for State PrisonersReform or Revocation, 61 GEo. L.J. 1221 (1973). Cf. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970).
41Hensley v. Municipal Ct., 411 US. 845, 855 (1978). In a series of Supreme Court
decisions relating to custody, the Supreme Court held that a parolee was under sufficient
restraints to constitute custody. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 US. 286 (1968). Then the
Court held that one need only have been in custody at the time the petition is filed;
jurisdiction is not defeated by the petitioner's subsequent release. Carafas v. LaVallee, 891
US. 284 (1968). Finally, the Court found bail sufficient custody within the meaning of the
habeas corpus statute, prompting Justice Rehnquist's remark. Hensley v. Municipal Ct.,
supra.
42Fay v. Noia, 872 U.S. 391, 427 n.88 (1968); Ex parte Medley, 134 US. 160, 178 (1890).
43 See Rhodes v. Craven, 425 F.2d 265 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 886 (1970);
Granville v. Hunt, 411 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1969); Long v. Parker, 890 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968);
United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 837 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
US. 985 (1965); United States v. Kniess, 251 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1958); United States ex rel.
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has been used in cases involving prison conditions. The rationale is
that an unlawful restraint of personal liberty may be inquired into
44
through habeas corpus even though the person is in lawful custody.
One might conclude that this application of the writ is quite restricted,
occurring only when a prisoner has been denied access to the courts. A
major portion of the case authority supporting this application of the
writ has dealt with that particular problem. 45 If this were the sole
authority, one might argue that this exceptional use of the writ exists,
in effect, to protect the writ. However, the writ has been used to challenge unjust prison conditions beyond denial of access, 40 and, as re47
cently as 1971, the Supreme Court has affirmed this expanded role.
Some construe this broader role as a temporary existence, filling a
void which had been awaiting a more appropriate remedy. It was argued by respondents in Preiserthat the Civil Rights Act was that more
appropriate remedy.48 The writ, it is true, is in some respects easier
for a prisoner to use 49 but, as we shall see, it pales in effectiveness beside the Civil Rights Act.
B.

The Civil Rights Act of 1871
1. A Broad Remedy. The Civil Rights Act has evolved as a broad
tool, one concerned with a great deal more than prison conditions. It
has conferred jurisdiction on courts in a number of diverse situations
involving welfare, 50 police procedures, 51 education, 52 and public housing.53 Interference in prisons and prison administration by the federal
Collins v. Heinze, 219 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1955); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.
1952).
44 In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1893).
45 See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (prison regulation forbidding prisoners
from giving each other legal assistance); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (prison regulation requiring prison approval of all legal papers); Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp.
585, 589 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 963
(1970) (denial of access).
46 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (transfer from high security section of mental institution to low security section); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th
Cir. 1944) (bodily harm and injuries from guards and co-inmates); Coonts v. Wainwright
282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969). In the case of federal prisoners courts are reluctant to use habeas corpus as a remedy and a petitioner's
claim is therefore construed as mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). See Taylor
v. Blackwell, 418 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1969) (loss of good time); Long v. Parker, 390
F.2d 816, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1967) (religious freedom).
47 Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
48 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 n.15 (1973).
49 See generally Zeigler, supra note 17, at 173-87.
50 Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
51 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
52 McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
53 Holmes v. Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
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courts, early eschewed, 54 is no longer a bar to constitutional inquiry
under the Civil Rights Act.55 The writ, by comparison, has had a
narrow civil rights application.
The difference between the two remedies is further contrasted by
the advantages the Civil Rights Act provides a complainant. The Civil
Rights Act does not require exhaustion of state remedies 56 and it allows one to use the liberal discovery techniques of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure; it also allows one to maintain a class action 7 and
to seek broad injunctive relief 8 and damages.5 9
The Civil Rights Act, like the writ, has grown from its original
restricted use. Like most post bellum measures, the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 was first ignored. 0 However it was used more and more frequently as the Bill of Rights became applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. When the 42d
Congress originally passed this as the Ku Klux Klan Act, it "was
514The hands-off doctrine by federal courts reflected the view that the felon was "the
slave of the State." Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790 (1871). The hands-off
doctrine left federal courts "without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations." Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). See United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate,
401 F.2d 55, 57 (7th Cir. 1968).
55 See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968).
GO See text accompanying notes 62-82 infra.
57 If the requisites of federal rule 23 are met, class actions will be recognized in a
number of situations. See Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971)
(brutality); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (corporal punishment); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971) (prison disciplinary practices); Rhem v.
McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (prison conditions); Washington v. Lee, 263 F.
Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 330 (1968) (racial segregation).
68 The plaintiff, of course, has the burden of showing irreparable injury in order to
obtain a preliminary injunction, e.g., some "cognizable danger of recurrent violation."
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Once this is done there is a
range of relief available. See Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (monitors, suspension of reassignment of correctional personnel and prosecution of officers).
There is the usual order that the practices shall cease and in some instances a requirement that corrective plans be submitted for the court's approval. See Jones v. Wittenberg,
330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub noma. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972). The court is also authorized to issue declaratory judgments which define the
rights and obligations of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
59 Damages may be recovered under section 1983, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972), and they may be ordinary tort damages,
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), or nominal damages, Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74
(3d Cir. 1965), or punitive damages, Caperd v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968). For
a comment on how and when to use damages in a civil rights action, see Hellerstein 8Shapiro, Prison Crisis Litigation, 21 BU=r. L. Rrv. 643, 655-56 (1972).
60 See generally T. E. EMERSON, D. HADER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1447-48 (3d ed. 1967); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1323, 1336-43 (1952); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil
Rights Act, 66 HRav. L. REv. 1285 (1953); Note, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an
Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951).
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passed by a partisan vote in a highly inflamed atmosphere. It [its passage] was preceded by spirited debate which pointed out its grave character and susceptibility to abuse . . . ."61 In later years the question
arose as to the applicability of two doctrines which would have seriously curtailed the effectiveness of the Act. A discussion of these two
doctrines, exhaustion and abstention, and the decision that they were
not applicable in the case of the Civil Rights Act tells us much about
the act and further distinguishes the Act from the writ. To begin this
discussion we must return to the "spirited debate" which transpired
when the Act was initially passed.
2. The No-Exhaustion Rule. The situation which compelled
President Grant to ask for federal legislation 2 was described by Senator Lowe of Kansas as murder "[s]talking abroad in disguise, while
whippings and lynchings and banishment have been visited upon inoffending American Citizens." 63 Senator Lowe decried the fact that "immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are
searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress." 64 President
Grant had complained that "the power to correct these evils is beyond
the control of state authorities" and he therefore asked for ".... such
legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life,
liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the
United States." 65
Although the ensuing debate was primarily concerned with the
Ku Klux Klan, it is clear that the Civil Rights Act was to afford a
broad remedy capable of dealing with much more than the single difficulty of the Klan.66 It was anticipated that the Act would override
conflicting 7 and inadequate state law. 8 And although this result came
more slowly in practice, the Act was to afford a "federal right in federal courts." Justice Douglas, speaking about the meaning of the term
"under color" of state law in Monroe v. Pape,69 used the phrase "federal right in federal courts" 70 and explained that this right was necessary '....

because by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance

61 Collins v. Hardyman, 341 US. 651, 657 (1951).
62 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 [hereinafter cited as
63 Id. at 374.

GLOBE].

64Id.
65

Id. at 244.

68 This can be ascertained by reviewing the comments made in opposition to the Act

by Senator Golloday of Tennessee, GLOBE, app. 160; Senator Thurman of Ohio,
app. 216; and Senator Voorhees of Indiana, GLOBE, app. 179.
67 GLOBE, app. 268.

68 Id. at 345.
69 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
70 Id. at 180.

GLOBE,
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or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced." 7' That state laws
might not be enforced led Justice Douglas to the expansive corollary
that one did not have to resort to a state remedy even if it would give
relief if enforced: "[tihe federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
72
federal one is invoked."
The Supreme Court subsequently obtained the same holding in
74
73
several cases: McNeese v. Board of Education, Damico v. California,
Houghton v. Shafer,75 and Wilwording v. Swenson.76 Despite this trend,
several courts have tried to restrict the Monroe holding to judicial
remedies by stating that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not
required but that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is re77
quired when the administrative remedy is sufficiently adequate.
Monroe and McNeese are susceptible to such a narrow interpretation
because Monroe did not involve administrative remedies and in
McNeese the administrative remedies were not "sufficiently adequate."7 8
However in Houghton, the first prisoner case in this series of cases, the
Court said that even though to require petitioner to pursue an administrative appeal would be futile, "resort to these [administrative]
remedies is unnecessary." 79 Finally, in Wilwording, another prisoner
case, the Court ignored the question of adequacy and repeated the
71 Id.
72 Id. at 183.
73 373 US. 668 (1963).
74 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
75 392 U.S. 639 (1968).

76404 US. 249 (1971).

77 The Second Circuit rule states that, although the prisoner resorts to a civil rights
complaint, if there is an adequate administrative procedural safeguard, it must be availed
of before going to a federal forum. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560-69 (2d Cir. 1969);
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1967). In those instances where the administrative remedy gives no assurance of getting the relief requested then it need not be
employed. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d at 569. In one case the federal district court even
set forth due process standards for prison censorship including notice to the inmates, opportunity to object, and a reliable body to make censorship decisions. Sostre v. Otis, 330
F. Supp. 941, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971);
Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
78 In McNeese the Court said "it is by no means clear that Illinois law provides petitioners with an administrative remedy sufficiently adequate to preclude prior resort to a
federal court for protection of their federal rights." 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963). However, the
Court also noted that "relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided a remedy." Id. at 671. Subsequently Damico cited McNeese and added the bracketed phrase, "an administrative," as
follows: "Relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not
first sought under state law which provided [an administrative]remedy" (emphasis added).
Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 417 (1967), citing McNeese v. Board of Educ., supra
at 671.
79 392 U.S. at 640.
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Houghton holding that "resort" was "unnecessary." 80 It is interesting
to note that Professor Davis, a respected commentator on administrative law who has railed against this apparent exception to the exhaustion doctrine,8 ' has grudgingly conceded, even without the benefit of
82
Wilwording, that this exception is based on "strong authority.
3. An Exception to Abstention. In another vein, seeking the same
result, it has been suggested that the federal courts abstain and not
consider civil rights questions. The grounds for a federal court abstaining are the possibility that the case may be disposed of by a state court
pursuant to state law or other reasons which will not require the federal court to involve itself.8 3 A simplification of the abstention doctrine
might say that whether the federal court can abstain or not depends
on whether the case involves law or equity. Generally speaking, in
cases of law, the federal court is unable to decline jurisdiction.8 4 However in cases involving an exercise of equitable discretion, federal
courts may decline on the ground of federal-state comity.85
Such a simplification-distinction as law-equity is not easily applied.86 One argument which has been pressed on the federal courts
in civil rights cases is that the federal court should abstain because the
remedy sought is equitable, usually an injunction, and state law would
be dispositive of the claim. Abstention in such a case was held improper.8 7 Ironically, the abstention doctrine, first enunciated in what
might be considered a civil rights case,88 was rejected in a civil rights
case.8 9 The court said:
80 404 U.S. at 252.
81 Professor Davis said:
Whatever reasons the Supreme Court may have for this startling result are obfuscated through the pretense that the Damico result followed from McNeese and
the pretense that the McNeese result followed from Monroe. The holdings seem
to be largely in the nature of unreasoned fiats, and the results seem altogether
unsatisfactory because they are so clearly contrary to such principles as have heretofore been discernible in exhaustion law.
K. DAVIS, ADMNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.10, at 668-69 (Supp. 1970). For a further
analysis of this question see id. § 20.01, at 642-48; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AD.,INISTRATIVE ACTION 438 n.51, 449 n.106 (1965).
82 DAVIS, supra note 81, § 20.10, at 669.
83 See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 196-208 (2d ed. 1970).
84 See, e.g., Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-86 (1943) (diversity
jurisdiction).
85 See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121-25 (1951). Cf. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1951).
86 See Note, Federal-QuestionAbstention: Justice Frankfurter'sDoctrine in an Activist
Era, 80 HARv. L. REv. 604 (1967).
87 Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan.), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
326 U.S. 690 (1945).
88 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (attempt to exclude black
porters from jobs by a state commission regulation).
89 Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan.), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
326 U.S. 690 (1945).
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Human rights [as opposed to property rights] under the Federal
Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and...
we have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction

simply because the right asserted may be adjudicated in some
other forum.90

To make clear exactly when this civil rights exception applied
and to avoid the risk of state nullification, Professor Wechsler proposed that the exception should extend to all those cases arising under
the various civil rights acts. 1 Almost two decades after his proposal
the Supreme Court recognized that when Congress drafted section
1983, Congress chose the federal courts as the primary forum for the
vindication of federal rights and the federal courts therefore have a
duty to give the suitor's choice of forum "due respect." 92 Thus, it can
be said about abstention that "cases involving vital questions of civil
93
rights are the least likely candidates for abstention."
C.

Alternative Remedies

A short review of the histories of these two remedies gives us
some idea of their nature. The role of habeas has expanded from the
narrow objective of curtailing the activities of the Ku Klux Klan into
a remedy which, independent of available state judicial or administrative remedies, can be relied on immediately to remedy constitutional
violations whether or not the injured party is a prisoner. Wilwording
represents the point where the meandering paths of these remedies
osculated and were recognized as equivalent alternatives, considerations of exhaustion aside, for a prisoner whose constitutional rights
have been violated.
III. PREISER v. RODIGUEZ
A. Three Prisoners

Preiser originally arose out of the complaints of three prisoners,
94
Rodriguez, Kritsky, and Katzoff, who in separate civil rights actions
90 Id. at 55. One basis for this exception, it has been argued, is the federal judiciary's
freedom from local prejudice, as evidenced, for example, by the life tenure of federal
judges. See Note, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YAL LJ. 1007, 1033-37
(1966); Romero v. Weakly, 226 F.2d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 1955).
92Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw &CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 230 (1948). The American Law Institute has recently proposed a
more narrow exception to the abstention doctrine. See ALI STUDY OF DIvISION OF JuIUsDICTION BmvEEEN STATE AND FEDutAL CouRTs § 1371(g), comment at 219-20 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1968).
92 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1967).
93 See Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 266 (2d Cir. 1968);
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967). See also McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 672-74 (1963).
94 Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Rodriguez v. McGinnis,
307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
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complained that they had been denied due process in the manner in
which they were deprived of good time. 95
Eugene Rodriguez had with him in his cell five letters from his
wife and five nude pictures of her. They were taken from him allegedly because they were contraband. Rodriguez was deprived of good
time, "60 days for the letters and 60 days for the pictures," 96 without
notice of the charge97 or issue of the reason for the disposition. 98 He
was then transferred to another prison and segregated for a month. 99
John Kritsky participated in a peaceful protest; it consisted of
prisoners remaining in their cells and refusing to work. Kritsky's protest cost him 590 days of good time after a "hearing" which did not
provide even a modicum of due process. At the "hearing," the charge
was stated, "advocating insurrection and a revolution and advocating
incendiarism." There was a query, "How do you plead?" and Kritsky's
response, "Not guilty."'100
Michael Katzoff, writing in his diary, described a prison official as
a "creep" and a "cigar smoking SOB" and in colorful language he described his desire to "couple" with two prison nurses.' 0 1 Katzoff, for his
private expressions, lost 30 days good time and was confined in segregation for 57 days (thus losing another 20 days good time since good
time cannot be earned while in segregation).
In all three cases the prisoners prevailed in the district court.
However separate panels of the Second Circuit reversed the judgments
of the district court with respect to Rodriguez and Katzoff. 10 The reasoning in these two cases was similar and regretfully foreshadowed
95 Each of the prisoners had elected to participate in the conditional release program
which allows a prisoner who is serving an indeterminate sentence to earn up to ten days
per month good behavior time credits toward the reduction of the maximum term. N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 70.30(4)(a), 70.40(l)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1967). One federal district judge considered this to be a "mandatory grant by its term and nature if the prisoner so behaves."
Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627, 630 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) (Foley, C.J.). Such good
time, however, may be withheld or revoked by the prison "for bad behavior, violation of
institutional rules or failure to perform properly in the duties or program assigned." N.Y.
CoRmEc. LAw § 803(1) (McKinney 1968).
96 307 F. Supp. at 631.
97 The district court found that the good time credit was withheld for possession of
contraband although "the questioning [by prison authorities] was solely in regard to how
he [Rodriguez] got the uncensored letters and photographs into Sing Sing." Id.
98 Although a state statute required the prison to forward its reason for withholding
good time to the Commissioner of Correction no such report issued. Id.
99 The district judge found there to be a deprivation of fundamental fairness. Id.
at 632.
100 313 F. Supp. at 1250.
101 Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558, 559 (2d Cir. 1971).
102 Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1971); Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d
558 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Preiser. Judge Hays characterized the Rodriguez application as a
habeas petition since the restoration of good time would result in
parole release. 10 3 The court decried any sidestep of the exhaustion requirement and thought it was "so absurd as to be laughable" for a
federal Court of Appeals to enmesh itself in "solemnly deciding on the
penalty in terms of good time a state prisoner should receive for having
dirty pictures in his cell (or for refusing to be a tattle tale)."'10 4 The
Katzoff reversal was based on similar reasoning. 10 5 Before a third panel
could consider Kritsky, the Court of Appeals set all three cases for
rehearing en banc.
By a vote of 9 to 3, in eight separate opinions, the court reinstated
the judgments of the district courts. 10 The court relied primarily on
Wilwording. Judge Kaufman in his concurrence did not construe
Wilwording as "ground breaking" but rather representative of a trend
of cases beginning with Monroe.0 7 He distinguished habeas corpus
as a remedy primarily suited to challenging convictions, 108 did not
think therefore that section 1983 was properly subsumed by the habeas
exhaustion requirement'019 and, in contrast to a previous panel's characterization of the prisoner's claim, regarded the facts before the court
as an indication of "callous disregard of his [the prisoner's] basic human and constitutional rights.""10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and the court's majority opinion was delivered by Justice
Stewart.
B.

Held: "Good time" at the "Core" of the Writ

The Supreme Court noted that the "essence of habeas corpus is
an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody and
that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody."' The Court noted that depriving prisoners of good
time caused illegal physical confinement. 11.2 A prisoner's challenge to
103 451 F.2d at 731-32.
104 Id. at 732.

105 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971).
108456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc.). For comment on the court's en banc decision, see 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 1078 (1972); 17 VmL. L. REv. 980 (1972).
107 456 F.2d at 82 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 83.

109 Judge Kaufman said:
I see no basis for radically expanding the impact of § 2254(b) or, to put it
another way, for concluding that Congress intended to carve out an exception to
§ 1983 for state prisoners challenging an invasion of their constitutional rights
during confinement and stating a valid claim for equitable relief.
110 Id. at 82-83.

111 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 487.
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the validity of the "fact or duration" of this illegal confinement was
held ".

.

. as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the

prisoner's conviction."" 3 The Court conceded that section 1983 was
literally applicable to the cases before the Court; however, Justice
Stewart held the more "specific" statute, habeas, to be the exclusive
remedy." 4 That this was indeed true was buoyed, in the Court's opinion, by the writ's exhaustion requirement which demonstrated "a
proper respect for state functions" whether administrative or judicial" n 5
Justice Stewart said that of course exhaustion was not required to the
extent that the state remedy was inadequate or unavailable. 1 6 To the
query, "How will a prisoner obtain damages when his rights have
been violated?", the Court responded that, while it was true "habeas
corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy," in those instances where damages were sought by prisoners they must be sought
pursuant to a civil rights complaint."7 This complaint for damages
would be in addition to a habeas application for "good time."
C. Dissent Faults "Faulty Analytic Foundation"
The majority decision exhibits two major faults: A failure to
appreciate the nature of the two remedies it discussed, a failure not
surprisingly based on a confusion between the habeas exhaustion rule
and the civil rights no-exhaustion, no-abstention rules; and the unmanageability of the proposed litigation scheme.
1. "Good time" and Habeas Corpus. Previously, the restoration of
good time was a proper remedy afforded by the Civil Rights Act." 8 It
is certainly surprising to find that the "core of habeas corpus," to the
exclusion of the Civil Rights Act, is concerned with cases which arise
when a man criticizes prison officials either in his diary or in a letter
to his parents."19
It is discouraging that Preiser may be abused. The loss of good
113 Id. at 489.
14 Id. at 490.
115 Id. at 491, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
"OId. at 493.
117 Id. at 493-94.
118 See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex reL Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va.
1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); contra, Douglas v. Sigler,
586 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967).

119 In Preiser, prisoner Katzoff lost good time because he had described a prison
official as a "creep" and in Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a
prisoner lost sixty days good time when he criticized prison officials in a letter to his
parents. See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972) (loss of good time for failure
to sign waiver sheet).
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time may become a more frequently imposed sanction to insulate the
prisoner from relief. Unclear as the definition of "core" is the impact
upon other disciplinary suits. Will all of them be within the
of Preiser
"core"? 120 Justice Brennan said in his dissent that at the nub of the
problem was the majority's "essentially ethereal concept, the 'core of
habeas corpus'."' 21 Our discussion of these two remedies has indicated
that, if one were to choose between remedies (and prior to Preiserone
did not have to choose),'1 22 the violations here in question seem particularly well-suited to the nature of section 1983 in contrast with,
as Justice Brennan refers to it, the majority's "faulty analytic foundation"'123 for habeas selection.
2. Specificity and Habeas Corpus. The Court rejected the Civil
Rights Act primarily for lack of specificity and in reliance on the policy
supporting the habeas exhaustion requirement.
It is ironic that Justice Stewart should refer to the "broad language"' 24 of section 1983 and decide that the habeas statute was preferable for specificity. The writ's language, "....

in custody in violation of

the constitution,' 125 arguably enables a prisoner to rely on the writ
whenever his constitutional rights are violated. Before Preiser a federal court did not construe the expansion of the writ as the contraction
of section 1983. Previously both remedies were available to prisoners.
3. Exhaustion and Habeas and the Civil Rights Act. In view of
the majority's reliance on exhaustion, Justice Brennan made several
distinctions about the exhaustion requirement, some more telling
than others. 126 He contended that exhaustion was a requirement born

of the respect between state and federal judiciaries and was a concept
inapplicable to the state administrative process. The question before
the Court involved a state administrative process and the Civil Rights
Act had a long history of dealing with administrative abuses. Thus,
of the two remedies, the Civil Rights Act was especially well-suited
for the task. In making this contention, however, Justice Brennan ignored the Supreme Court's inquiry in Morrissey v. Brewer 27 into ad120

For a tentative response to this question, see text accompanying notes 134-47

infra.

121411 U.S. at 506. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122

See notes 15-91 supra and accompanying text.

123 411 U.S. at 512.
124 Id. at 489. Justice Brennan in his dissent criticized this analysis by taking the
"broad language" of section 1983 to its extreme. He says, "every application by a state
prisoner for federal habeas corpus relief against his jailers could as a matter of logic and
semantics be viewed as an action under the Ku Klux Act." Id. at 504.
125 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970).
126 411 US. at 512-24.

127 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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ministratively imposed parole revocations and its determination that

exhaustion applied in those cases.
More to the point was Justice Brennan's query, why if interference is the concern of the majority, does the Court stop here in precluding section 1983 jurisdiction? Why indeed, since section 1983 interferes with the state in so many areas besides prison problems?
Finally Justice Brennan confronts the majority's exhaustion rationale by explaining that, unlike the federal habeas statute, the Civil
Rights Act does not genuflect to state or administrative process because to do so would frustrate the Act's Congressional mandate. 128

4. Two Forums for One Injury. Justice Brennan called the majority opinion an "ungainly and irrational scheme.'

1 29

He chose to il-

lustrate the unmanageability of the majority decision by posing the
question of what will happen when a case falls outside the "core of
habeas corpus," when a prisoner challenges the condition of confinement and not the fact or duration of confinement. 13 0 Assuming solitary
confinement to be without the "core of habeas corpus" (an assumption
1 31
which should not be lightly taken in view of the majority's language),'
Brennan proposed a fact situation in which a prisoner was both deprived of good time and placed in solitary. Relying on Wilwording, he
expected that those questions without the core of habeas corpus could
be raised by either remedy and he implicitly anticipated that a prisoner
with a choice would choose the Civil Rights Act. He therefore foresaw
a situation in which a prisoner litigated both in state court (to recover
lost time) and in federal court (to obtain injunctive relief to remedy
confinement and to recover damages) and whichever court reached
its decision first would settle the question for the other forum by reason of res judicata 32 Justice Brennan understated, "[t]his is plainly
128 411 U.S. at 516-21.
129 Id.

at 504.

130 Id. at 506-12.

131 See text accompanying notes 134-47 infra.
132 411 U.S. at 511. The prisoner would initiate his state action to satisfy the exhaustion requirement (implicit is the assumption that there is an available and adequate state
remedy) and the federal action reflects an informed choice on the part of the prisoner
concerning the effectiveness of section 1988. A course of action that suggests itself is that
the prisoner should always initiate the section 1983 action first. This would bind the state
court by reason of res judicata. Although in Justice Brennan's example, the habeas
corpus re-litigation rules were not operable, 411 U.S. at 509 n.14, it is dear that when the
federal habeas application is filed the facts can be re-litigated pursuant to Townsend. It
is doubtful, however, that the prior findings in the section 1983 action would be rejected
as the product of "inadequate procedure." Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217
(1969) (presumed adequacy of section 2255 fact finding procedures). If the state should
make its decision first Justice Brennan suggests that although there is case law that says
res judicata applies to section 1983, the policy of section 1983 may not comport with this
bar to re-litigation and these lower courts "may well be in error." 411 U.S. at 509 n.14.
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a curious prescription for improving relations between state and federal
courts,"'' 33 critically referring to the majority's policy rationale of federal-state comity.
The Limits of the Core?
The question left after Preiseris what is outside the core of habeas
corpus? Or conversely, to what extent is the Civil Rights Act when relied on by prisoners now constricted? The answer to this question, it
seems, is dependent on the meaning of the term release.
Even as a person remains in custody he suffers varying deprivations of liberty. The spectrum of liberty while in custody proceeds
from solitary confinement to segregation to maximum security to low
security to parole. In each circumstance the individual remains in custody, yet his position proceeds from least desirable to most desirable.
A case that is useful in discussing this liberty spectrum is Morrissey v. Brewer.13 4 Morrissey held that parole revocation is a deprivation
of liberty within the meaning of the due process clause. Although this
holding of itself is not particularly helpful, the reasoning that led to
it is. Morrissey observed that even though one was in "custody,"
whether a parolee or an inmate, there was a substantial difference between the "conditional freedom" of parole and a "mere anticipation
of hope of freedom."'' 35 Custody and liberty, as we have observed, are
therefore not mutually exclusive. Parole is custody. However, parole
is considered a return to useful life. 36 Time spent on parole is not
credited' 37 as time served, no doubt largely because parole "enables...
[the parolee] to do a wide range of things open to persons who have
138
never been convicted of any crime."'
The kind of liberty described in Morrissey is easy to appreciate,
"out" versus "in" prison. However, what about the spectrum of liberty
as above described? The calipers used to measure freedom have apparently become more sensitive as evidenced by a recent Seventh
Circuit decision. In United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 39 decided
D.

183 Id. at 511.

408 U.S. 471 (1972).
135 See United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir. 1971).
'34

136 See generally Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. L.J. 705
(1968); Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 702 (1963); Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings,
72 YA= L.J. 368 (1962).
137 See Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 Ciuma &
DELMNQ. 267, 271 (1969); Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 Gao. L.J. 705,

733 (1968).
188 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
139 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
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after Preiser,140 several prisoners attacked, on due process grounds, the
loss of good time and punitive segregation. The court found the loss
of good time was a "grievous loss" because it affected the timing of the
prisoner's release. In the sense that the question was release, Miller
closely parallels Morrissey. The court's decision is also not unlike the
Preiserview of good time. The more interesting aspect of the case, for
our purposes, is the court's reasoning with respect to the question of
punitive segregation. Punitive segregation, while it did not comport
with the Morrissey analysis of liberty, i.e., parole freedom, was also
held to be a "grievous loss." The standard for a "grievous loss" of

liberty, the court explained, is an "additional punishment inflicted
upon an inmate . . . sufficiently severe, and [which] represent[s] a

sufficiently drastic change from the custodial status theretofore enjoyed . ...",141 Relief for this loss might be considered to be release.

Release is a question which Preiseraddressed and the implications of
the Miller analysis should be apparent. Thus we have another question: was Justice Brennan correct in his dissent when he suggested that
solitary could be remedied by injunctive relief in a section 1983 com42
plaint?1
Heretofore, questions of solitary were properly raised in a civil
rights complaint, although some might argue the only appropriate
relief was monetary damages.143 At least one circuit held before
Preiser that an attack on solitary was a question properly raised in a
writ and not in a complaint. 4 4 In questions of solitary confinement,
140 As indicated, the prisoners sought among other relief the restoration of good time.
The court in Miller said, in view of Preiser, that the remedy was by way of habeas. Id.
at 703.
141 Id. at 717.
:142 In Justice Brennan's hypothetical, he suggests solitary could be remedied by injunctive relief sought pursuant to section 1983. See text accompanying notes 129-33 infra.
143 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1971). Haines is often cited for the proposition that section 1983 provides a means to remedy confinement imposed without due
process safeguards. It is interesting to note that the prisoner at the time of the complaint
in Haines was not in solitary (he was only in solitary for fifteen days). His claim was
solely for damages. See Haines v. Kerner, 427 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1970). There are other
section 1983 complaints with similar fact situations. See United States ex rel. Jones v.
Rundle, 453 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1971) (solitary confinement and denial of right to practice
religion but relief sought for damages); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1971)
(attack at lost privileges while in solitary, not solitary confinement itself, and relief sought
was restoration of privileges and damages).
144 Jones v. Decker, 436 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). In Jones, the prisoner
sought to be free from solitary but his claim was not cognizable under section 1983. His
application was treated as a petition for a writ and dismissed for failure to exhaust. It is
interesting that the court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the prisoner's damage
claim. See text accompanying notes 129-33, 140 supra. The court cited as authority for its
holding rejecting petitioner's claim another Fifth Circuit case which involved a prisoner's
collateral attack. Johnson v. Walker, 317 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963).
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section 1983, if not previously restricted in terms of relief to damages,
may be from now on in view of the Miller analysis.
So may questions raised regarding other prison disciplinary procedures. On our spectrum we indicated a prisoner might be in custody
in a maximum security or low security area. While neither status of
itself suggests a possible application of Miller, if the prisoner were
transferred from low to high without due process protection he might
suffer a "grievous loss." As a rule the transfer from one institution to
another is "peculiarly within the scope of the administration of the
state penal system.' 1 45 Certainly, a priori, a transfer within the same
institution would be within the scope of administration as well. However, a prisoner, who was committed by defective proceedings to a
high security prison and sought transfer to a less restrictive area, was
held to state a due process claim in view of the "substantial difference"
between the two forms of custody.14 6 It is not clear whether such a
claim, even before Preiser, would be cognizable under section 1983;
1 47
the transfer claim recognized by the court was the gravamen of a writ.
However, in view of the susceptibility of this example to a Miller
analysis, it is suggested that before long, transfers as well as solitary
confinement may find themselves within the exclusive confines of the
"core of habeas corpus."
IV.

CONCLUSION

Where there were two remedies, one remains. This has occurred
because the Court has misunderstood the nature of the remedies and
their concomitant exhaustion and no-exhaustion doctrines. Even if
Preiser is restricted to good time questions, it will encourage abuse
by prison officials and deny a prisoner the speedy relief for which an
act of Congress provided.
Preiser'sscheme is irrational. The PreiserCourt, apparently relying on the rationale of comity, proffered a bifurcated remedy that
Justice Brennan has aptly characterized as "....

a curious prescription

48
for improving relations between state and federal courts."'
If the Miller analysis is applicable, Preisermay henceforth be read
145 United States ex rel. Verde v. Case, 326 F. Supp. 701, 704, (E.D. Pa. 1971). See
United States ex rel. Thomas v. Bookbinder, 380 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United
States ex rel. Stuart v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1055 (1970).
146 See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
147 Id. This case has been cited for the proposition that it expands the scope of
habeas corpus. See note 46 supra. The nature of this claim is a due process claim which
formed the common ground occupied by both remedies prior to Preiser.
148 411 U.S. 475, 511 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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as applying more broadly than simply to good time questions. For
where the prisoner's interest is sufficient to require due process, there
may exist a circumstance where the remedy is considered equivalent
to release, thereby limiting a prisoner's relief to the writ. Solitary confinement and certain transfers strike one as amenable to such an interpretation. The Preiserdecision therefore may seriously restrict the
scope of section 1983, and possibly preclude it, in matters of prison
discipline.
Finally, the Court has thrown away an opportunity. Preiser has
been cast upon a landscape of confused law and complicated remedies
and served only to further confound the difficulty. The Court has done
this at a time of crisis in the prisons when clarification, not confusion,
is needed.

